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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PANDEMICS, POPULISM AND THE ROLE OF LAW IN THE H1N1
VACCINE CAMPAIGN
WENDY E. PARMET*
In the spring of 2009, a new strain of type A influenza (H1N1) arrived
triggering the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century.1 With the initial
discovery of the virus, scientists began working on developing a vaccine, the
intervention widely believed to offer the greatest protection against an
influenza pandemic.2 Shortly thereafter, federal health officials utilized a
series of legal tools that had been put into place in the years prior to the
pandemic to facilitate the rapid development and distribution of a vaccine.3
By many measures, the use of these tools was a great success. By the end
of 2009, approximately 61 million Americans had been vaccinated against
H1N1; by January 2010, over 124 million doses of vaccine had been
distributed in the U.S.4 Although vaccination rates varied widely by state, in
most states vaccination rates for children, a group at high risk for severe
disease from H1N1, were higher than their prior rates for seasonal flu
Perhaps more importantly, the Vaccine Adverse Event
vaccination.5

* George J. and Kathleen Waters Matthews Distinguished Professor of Law, Northeastern
University.
1. A dispute exists as to whether the H1N1 outbreak should be described as a
pandemic. In May 2009, WHO changed its definition of a pandemic so as to exclude any
consideration of the severity of a disease. See Deborah Cohen & Philip Carter, WHO and the
Pandemic Flu “Conspiracies,” 340 BRIT. MED. J. 1274, 1275 (2010). Despite this debate, the
H1N1 outbreak will be termed a pandemic throughout this article.
2. See Press Release Ctr., CDC Briefing on Public Health Investigation of Human Cases
of Swine Influenza, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (CDC) (Apr. 23, 2009),
http://cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t090423.htm. See also Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Interim Results: Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccination Coverage –
United States, October – December 2009, 59 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 44, 46-47
(2010) (discussing that by the end of 2009, eighty-five million doses of H1N1 vaccine had
been produced by U.S. drug manufacturers, and an estimated sixty-one million Americans had
received the vaccine).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 54-77 and 195-96.
4. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Interim Results: State-Specific Influenza A
(H1N1) 2009 Monovalent Vaccination Coverage—United States, October 2009 - January
2010, 59 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 363, 363 (2010).
5. Id. at 364.
113

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

114

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:113

Reporting System (VAERS) uncovered no “unusual events or pattern of
adverse events,” different from that which is seen for seasonal flu vaccine.6
By other measures, however, the campaign appeared less successful.
Despite scientists’ best efforts, the vaccine took longer than anticipated to
produce and was in woefully short supply during the height of the
pandemic.7 As a result, many children and adults at high risk for severe
disease were unable to obtain a vaccine when they most needed it, in the
early fall of 2009.8 Yet, by late fall and early winter, as supplies became
more plentiful, the public’s fears of the disease abated and were
increasingly replaced by concerns about the vaccine’s safety.9 Critics also
charged that the pandemic had been hyped by health officials to provide
profits for vaccine makers.10 By the winter of 2010, over sixty million doses
of vaccine were unused; many were destined to be destroyed.11
What role did law play in both the successes and the shortfalls of the
H1N1 vaccine campaign? What lessons can be learned to guide future
efforts to use law to protect the public from pandemic flu? This article
explores those questions, focusing on public health emergency laws’ impact
on the H1N1 vaccine program and the interaction of those laws with the
current populist stance in American political culture.12 Populism, a recurring
riff in American history, is a political attitude most pointedly characterized by
a profound distrust of elites.13 As such, it represents a significant challenge
6. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Summary of 2009 Monovalent H1N1
Influenza Vaccine Data – Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, Data Through May 29,
2010 (2010), available at http://vaers.hhs.gov/resources/2010H1N1Summary_June03.pdf
(finding that as of May 29, 2010, sixty deaths were reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event
Reporting System (VAERS) in conjunction with the H1N1 vaccine. However, the CDC found
no evidence to suggest these deaths were caused by the vaccine.).
7. Associated Press, Poll Indicates Swine Flu Vaccine Scarce, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7,
2009, at A2.
8. Stephanie Ebbert, Mom vs. Mom, Anxiety Fuels Competition to Score Swine Flu Shots
for their Kids, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 21, 2009, at 26; Gillian K. SteelFisher et al., The Public’s
Response to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e65(1), e65(1)-(2),
e65(4)-(5) (2010).
9. Id. at e65(5).
10. See Barbara Loe Fisher, Politics, Profits & Pandemic Fear Mongering, NAT’L VACCINE
INFO. CTR. BLOG (May 1, 2009), http://www.nvic.org/NVIC-Vaccine-News/May-2009/Friday,
-May-01,-2009-Politics,-Profits---Pandemic-.aspx.
11. Stephen Smith, Swine Flu Vaccine is Widely Unused, BOSTON GLOBE, May 22, 2010,
at B1; Mike Stobbe, Associated Press, Millions of Vaccine Doses to be Burned, ABC NEWS,
July 1, 2010, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=11061293.
12. For a discussion of contemporary populism, see Steve Fraser & Joshua B. Freeman,
The Strange History of Tea Party Populism, SALON (May 3, 2010), http://www.salon.com/
news/feature/2010/05/03/tea_party_populism_history.
13. Political scientists and political historians have offered many definitions of populism.
Michael Kazin, in his history of American populism, writes that the most “telling definition of
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to public health officials and policymakers, who are almost always elites, or
are at least widely perceived as such, in their attempt to respond to a
pandemic. In particular, populism poses a dilemma for public health
professionals who seek to protect public health via vaccination because
populism builds upon and exacerbates distrust of health officials’ assertions
about the need for vaccination and its safety. At the same time, the public’s
distrust of vaccines may spur officials to act even more forcefully than they
otherwise would. In either case, law may bridge or widen the divide
between public health officials and the populations they are charged with
protecting.
Part One begins by providing a brief review of influenza pandemics and
recent efforts to prepare for one. The section then describes the 2009
H1N1 vaccine campaign within the U.S. Part Two examines why vaccines
are critical to pandemic preparedness and considers the challenges
policymakers face in securing both an adequate supply and a robust
demand for pandemic vaccines. Part Three reviews the legal responses that
have been put in place over the last thirty years to address supply side
problems. Part Four turns to the demand side of the equation, reviewing the
legal responses that public health officials have employed to address the
public’s reluctance to be vaccinated. Both Part Five and the Conclusion
assess the relationship between the legal responses to supply and demand
problems, and suggest that the laws that have been enacted to facilitate the
development and distribution of pandemic vaccines may heighten the
public’s distrust of public health officials. If so, these laws may fail to
achieve their goal of protecting the public from a pandemic.
PART ONE: A PANDEMIC PREDICTED
For more than five years, the specter of pandemic influenza has hovered
over U.S. and world public health policy.14 In the past one hundred years,
there have been three major influenza pandemics, none more lethal than
the misnamed 1918 “Spanish flu” pandemic.15 That pandemic, which
populism” is a “language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble assemblage
not bounded narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self-serving and undemocratic,
and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.” MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION:
AN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (Cornell University 1998) (1995).
14. See, e.g., Sandra Mounier-Jack & Richard J. Coker, How Prepared is Europe for
Pandemic Influenza: Analysis of National Plans, 367 LANCET 1405, 1405-11 (2006)
(analyzing European countries’ pandemic preparedness plans). See also Jaro Kotalik,
Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic: Ethical Issues, 19 BIOETHICS 422, 422-31 (2005)
(analyzing pandemic preparedness plans of Canada, United Kingdom, and the United States
from an ethical perspective).
15. See JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF THE DEADLIEST PLAGUE IN
HISTORY 4, 113-14, 117 (2004).
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broke out in the waning days of World War I, is estimated to have killed
between twenty and one hundred million people around the globe, making
it the most deadly outbreak in recorded history.16 In 1957, the less lethal
but still quite deadly Asian flu pandemic struck, killing approximately two
million people worldwide.17 In 1967, the Hong Kong flu pandemic killed
an estimated one million people.18
In the years since 1967, scientists have repeatedly warned that another
influenza pandemic, possibly as grave as the 1918 outbreak, was
inevitable.19 That warning struck a chord with the Ford Administration in
1976 when it ordered an unprecedented vaccination program after several
soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey, contracted, and one died, from a swine flu
After
virus that scientists thought resembled the 1918 strain.20
approximately forty million Americans were vaccinated, the dreaded
pandemic failed to materialize.21 The program was shelved as worries grew
that the vaccine caused Guillian-Barré syndrome.22 In subsequent years, the
1976 swine flu vaccine campaign served to illustrate the pitfalls public
health officials face when they initiate prevention campaigns based on
limited information.23 The campaign’s history also highlights the potential
gulf between the perspective of public health officials, who stress the need to

16. Id. at 4. See also GINA KOLOTA, FLU: THE STORY OF THE GREAT INFLUENZA PANDEMIC
7 (1999).
17. Global Alert and Response, Ten Concerns if Avian Influenza Becomes a Pandemic,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 14, 2005), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic10
things/en [hereinafter WHO]. See also BARRY, supra note 15, at 115.
18. WHO, supra note 17.
19. Peter A. Patriarca & Nancy J. Cox, Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Plans for the
United States, 176 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES S4, S4 (1997).
20. RICHARD NEUSTADT & HARVEY FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR: DECISION-MAKING ON A
SLIPPERY DISEASE 5-6, 24-30 (University Press of the Pacific 2005) (1978). See also KOLOTA,
supra note 16, at 121-50 (recounting the 1976 death of a soldier at Fort Dix, the effort to
identify the virus, and the Ford Administration’s response).
21. KOLOTA, supra note 16, at 167; J.S. Malik Peiris, Leo L.M. Poon & Yi Guan,
Emergence of a Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A Virus (S-OIV) H1N1 Virus in Humans, 45 J.
CLIN. VIROLOGY 169, 170 (2009).
22. Nina S. Appel, Liability in Mass Immunization Programs, 1980 BYU L. REV. 69, 72
(1980); Peiris, Poon & Guan, supra note 21, at 170. Whether the vaccine actually caused
Guillain-Barré syndrome remains controversial. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Fears of a Swine
Flu Epidemic in 1976 Offer Some Lessons, and Concerns, Today, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2009, at
A11 (quoting experts who question whether the 1976 vaccine caused Guillain-Barré
syndrome); Lawrence B. Schonberger et al., Guillain-Barre Syndrome Following Vaccination in
the National Influenza Immunization Program, United States, 1976-1977, 110 AMER. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 105, 105-22 (1979) (finding an association between the vaccine and the
syndrome).
23. NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 20, at 1-2.
OF 1918 AND THE SEARCH FOR THE VIRUS IT CAUSED
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“err on the side of overreaction,”24 and the views of the populations that
officials seek to protect.
In the 1990s, in response to a plethora of new infectious diseases, as
well as broader social developments,25 scientists, health officials, and the
media increasingly focused their attention on the dangers of so-called
emerging diseases.26 As fear of contagion took hold,27 scientists were quick
to warn that no disease has ever proven more lethal than the 1918
influenza and that there was no reason to assume that such a horrific
pandemic could not happen again.28 That prophecy seemed prescient in
1997, when several young, previously healthy people died in Hong Kong
from a new strain of avian influenza, known as H5N1.29 Fortunately, Hong
Kong was able to quash the outbreak by slaughtering its chickens.30 But the
virus did not vanish with the chickens; in the years that followed, H5N1
spread around the globe. By 2005, the virus had infected birds in sixteen
countries and over 120 people.31 Although the virus was not easily
transmissible among humans (almost everyone who became ill had been in
close contact with infected birds), it had a high (approximately fifty percent)

24. David J. Sencer & J. Donald Millar, Reflections on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination
Program, 12 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 29, 33 (2006), reprinted in THE DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS OF THE 2009-H1N1 INFLUENZA A PANDEMIC 297, 305 (David Relman et
al., 2009).
25. Wendy Parmet, Public Health and Social Control 14-19 (Int’l Council on Human
Rights Pol’y, Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/173/
public_health_and_social_control_wendy_parmet.pdf. The claims that scientists and public
health officials focused attention on emerging diseases is not meant to imply that they acted in
bad faith; rather that they responded to social as well as biological developments.
26. See id. for a more complete discussion of the renewed concern that scientists,
officials, and the media gave to infectious disease in the 1990s.
27. See PRISCILLA WALD, CONTAGIOUS: CULTURES, CARRIERS, AND THE OUTBREAK NARRATIVE
1-28 (Duke University Press, 2008) (discussing fear of contagious disease in the 1990s).
28. E.g., W. Paul Glezen, Emerging Infections: Pandemic Influenza, 18 EPIDEMIOLOGIC
REVS. 64, 64-65 (1996); Robin Marantz Henig, The Flu Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
1992, at 28; Kennedy F. Shortridge, The Next Pandemic Influenza Virus?, 346 LANCET 1210,
1210-11 (1995).
29. See PETE DAVIES, THE DEVIL’S FLU: THE WORLD’S DEADLIEST INFLUENZA EPIDEMIC AND THE
SCIENTIFIC HUNT FOR THE VIRUS THAT CAUSED IT 1-64 (2000). In the wake of the outbreak in
Hong Kong, several authors wrote books designed to acquaint a popular audience with the
1918 epidemic and warn about the possibility of a new pandemic. See, e.g., BARRY, supra
note 15; KOLOTA, supra note 16.
30. Nina Y. Kung et al., Risk for Infection with Highly Pathogenic Influenza A Virus (H5N1)
in Chickens, Hong Kong, 2002, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 412, 412 (2007).
31. HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 1, 1
(2005) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

118

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:113

case mortality rate.32 Chastened by the world’s experience in 2003 with
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), health officials around the globe
intensified their cry for pandemic preparedness.33
The Bush Administration responded in 2005 by releasing the National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza34 (Strategy), which was designed to guide
federal efforts to plan and prepare for a potential influenza pandemic.35
Vaccination played a prominent role in the Strategy:
In combination with traditional public health measures, vaccines and
antiviral drugs form the foundation of our infection control strategy.
Vaccination is the most important element of this strategy, but we
acknowledge that a two-pronged strategy incorporating both vaccines and
antivirals is essential.36

More specifically, the Strategy called for enhancing domestic production of
influenza vaccination so that the entire population could be vaccinated
within six months of the start of a pandemic, stockpiling sufficient prepandemic avian influenza vaccine to immediately vaccinate “front-line
personnel and at risk populations including military personnel,” developing
distribution plans, and eradicating “regulatory and other legal barriers to
the expansion of our domestic vaccine production capacity.”37
The federal government’s approach for meeting those goals was spelled
out more explicitly in the Homeland Security Council’s 2006 Implementation
Plan.38 Underlying the Implementation Plan was the assumption that
pandemic influenza would initially develop overseas. The plan aimed to
improve surveillance and detection of influenza around the world so that the
federal government could try to contain, or at least slow down, the spread
of a pandemic within the United States until such time as a vaccine would
be widely available.39 Targeted deployment of pre-pandemic vaccine and
32. Id.; DAVIES, supra note 29, at 26-27; Arunee Thitithanyanont et al., High Susceptibiity
of Human Dendritic Cells to Avian Influenza H5N1 Virus Infection and Protection by IFN–α and
TLR Ligands, 179 J. IMMUNOLOGY 5220, 5220 (2007).
33. See Richard J. Webby & Robert G. Webster, Are We Ready for Pandemic Influenza?,
320 SCIENCE 1519, 1519 (2003) (reviewing pandemic preparedness plans after threats of
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), bioterrorism, West Nile virus, and other threats).
34. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 31.
35. Around the same time, the CDC published proposed revised quarantine regulations,
but the regulations were never promulgated. Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed.
Reg. 71892 (Nov. 20, 2005).
Additionally, the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act (PREPA), Pub. L. 109-148, was enacted in 2005. For a more complete
discussion of PREPA, see infra text accompanying notes 179-99.
36. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 31, at 5.
37. Id.
38. See HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA:
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 104-07 (2006) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION PLAN].
39. Id. at 1.
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antiviral medications, potentially in conjunction with non-pharmaceutical
interventions (such as quarantines or border closings), were critical to the
plan.40
Although a pandemic was widely predicted, the one that arrived in the
spring of 2009 did not conform to health officials’ prognostications.41
Pandemic planning reports had repeatedly cited the 1918 outbreak,
warning that “a modern pandemic could lead to the deaths of 200,000 to 2
million people in the United States alone.”42 Fortunately, H1N1 proved to
be far less deadly. As of March 2010, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) reported that about 12,000 people died from H1N1,43
meaning that fewer Americans died from the H1N1 pandemic than die from
so-called seasonal flu in a typical year.44 That comparison, however, may
understate H1N1’s impact. In contrast to seasonal flu, but as in 1918,
serious illness and death were disproportionately experienced by persons
under age forty-five.45 Young children and pregnant women faced
especially high risks.46 In the first wave of the pandemic, between April and
August 2009, five percent of all deaths from H1N1 were among pregnant
women, even though pregnant women represent only one percent of the

40. Id. at 105-08.
41. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary
Highlights, April 2009-April 2010 (June 16, 2010), http://cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm,
for a discussion of evolution of the 2009 pandemic [hereinafter Summary Highlights].
42. See IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 38, at 1.
43. Press Release,CDC 2009 H1N1 Flu Media Briefing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Mar. 29, 2010), http://cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2010/t100329.htm.
44. There is debate over the death toll of seasonal flu because most deaths attributed to
influenza are not confirmed by laboratory analysis, and influenza resembles and may
complicate many other illnesses. Estimates vary from approximately 21,000 deaths per year
in the U.S. to over 40,000 deaths per year. For a review of the literature and a discussion of
one regression model that purports to show an annual average death toll of 41,000, see
Jonathan Dushoff et al., Mortality Due to Influenza in the United States – An Annualized
Regression Approach Using Multiple-Cause Mortality Data, 163 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 181,
181-87 (2005). Recently, the CDC has lowered its estimate of annual deaths from seasonal
flu from 36,000 to 24,000. See Estimate Lowered of Typical Flu Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2010, at A14.
45. Kristen A. Swedish, Gina Conenello & Stephanie H. Factor, First Season of 2009
H1N1 Influenza, 77 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 103, 105, 108 (2010).
46. Id. These groups are also at high risk for seasonal flu. What distinguished H1N1 is
that individuals over sixty-five did not face high risks. Other high risk groups for H1N1
included people with chronic diseases or obesity. See id. at 108.
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U.S. population.47 Disproportionate rates of morbidity and mortality were
also reported among American Indian and Alaskan Natives.48
H1N1 also defied predictions by originating in North America.49
Contrary to expectations,50 by the time the virus was detected, it had already
spread widely in the United States and Mexico.51 Containment by targeted
distribution of antiviral medications, border closings, or quarantine was
impossible.52 As a result, health officials were forced to rely on widely
promulgated appeals for hand-washing and respiratory etiquette to slow the
virus’ spread.53
Federal officials also quickly launched the nation’s second swine flu
vaccine campaign, even as they noted that vaccine would not be available
for many months.54 As early as April 26, 2009, just days after the CDC
announced that the first cases of H1N1 had been identified, the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) declared a public health emergency,
setting the stage for the issuance of “Emergency Use Authorizations” (EUAs)

47. Alicia M. Siston et al., Pandemic 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Illness Among
Pregnant Women in the United States, 303 JAMA 1517, 1522-23 (2010).
48. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Deaths Related to 2009 Pandemic Influenza A
(H1N1) Among American Indian/Alaska Natives - 12 States, 2009, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 1341, 1341 (2009).
49. Novel H1N1 Flu: Background on the Situation, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (July 31, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/background.htm.
50. As historians and sociologists have noted, it is common to assume that fearsome
diseases derive from “abroad.” See Parmet, Public Health and Social Control, supra note 25,
at 13-14.
51. SARAH A. LISTER & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40554, THE 2009
INFLUENZA A (H1N1) “SWINE FLU” OUTBREAK: AN OVERVIEW 1, 1 (2009); Novel H1N1 Flu:
Background on the Situation, supra note 49.
52. LISTER & REDHEAD, supra note 51, at 2.
53. See Questions and Answers: 2009 H1N1 (“Swine Flu”) and You, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/qa.htm (CDC’s
recommendations to prevent H1N1 spreading by hand washing and covering coughs). In the
early days of the pandemic, some communities closed their schools. LISTER & REDHEAD, supra
note 51. The CDC stated that “[s]chool dismissal and childcare closures are an important
part of a comprehensive, layered mitigation approach” to H1N1. CDC Health Update:
School (K – 12) Dismissal and Childcare Facilities: Interim CDC Guidance in Response to
Human Infections with The Influenza A H1N1 Virus, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(May 1, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/HAN?050109.htm. A few days later, CDC
revised its guidance to recommend that schools only be closed if too many students and
teachers were ill to enable the schools to function. Media Statement, Change in CDC’s
School and Childcare Guidance, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 5, 2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressre/2009/S090505.htm.
54. Andrew Pollack, Swine Flu Vaccine May Be Months Away, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009,
at A10.
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permitting the unlicensed use of laboratory tests and antiviral medications.55
In May 2009, the federal government set aside $1 billion for vaccine
development.56 By June, as the virus spread around the world, The Wall
Street Journal reported that drug companies were “ramping up [vaccine]
production.”57 Around the same time, DHHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius
issued the first of many so-called “PREPA” declarations, finding H1N1 to be
a public health emergency and authorizing immunity for those making or
administering H1N1 vaccines.58
In July 2009, citing the risk that the H1N1 pandemic could reappear in
the fall, the federal government decided to push ahead with the H1N1
vaccine campaign.59 The CDC issued guidance to state and local public
health departments about the coming fall vaccination campaign and held a
“summit” to discuss plans and priorities.60 That same month, an advisory
committee for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommended that
the FDA license the vaccine without waiting for the results of clinical trials.61
On July 13, the federal government signed a $1 billion contract with four
companies to purchase components for the vaccine.62
Throughout the summer of 2009, work continued on manufacturing the
vaccine and planning for its eventual distribution.63 But on October 16,
scientists reported that the vaccine was taking longer than anticipated to

55. Charles E. Johnson, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Determination that a Public
Health Emergency Exists, FLU.GOV (Apr. 26, 2009), http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/
h1n1emergency042609.html. The emergency was eventually allowed to expire on June 23,
2010. Press Release, Influenza Public Health Emergency Determination Expired on June 23:
HHS Encourages Americans to Continue to Practice Flu Prevention Techniques, FLU.GOV,
http://www.flu.gov/news/h1n1pheexpiration.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010); Summary
Highlights, supra note 41 (issuing an Emergency Use Authorization allows usage of antiviral
drugs in a manner different than what was approved by the FDA).
56. Betsy McKay, For Flu Vaccine, U.S. Sets Aside $1 Billion, WALL ST. J., May 23-24,
2009, at A4.
57. Jeanne Whelan, Flu Pandemic Spurs Queries About Vaccine, WALL ST. J., June 15,
2009, at A11.
58. Pandemic Influenza Antivirals – Amendment, 74 Fed. Reg. 29213 (June 19, 2009)
(amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d, 319F-3(b)).
59. Betsy McKay, Plans for Vaccination Campaign Begin, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2009, at
A4.
60. Summary Highlights, supra note 41.
61. Jennifer Corbett Dooren & Nicholas Winning, Swine Flu Prevention Takes on New
Urgency, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2009, at A3.
62. Jennifer Corbett Dooren, Health & Wellness: U.S. to Buy H1N1 Vaccine Components
from Four Firms, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at D4.
63. See Rob Stein, Swine Flu Could Infect Half of U.S.: Presidential Panel’s Estimate is First
to Gauge Possible Impact of Epidemic, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2009, at A1.
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produce.64 As the public waited for the vaccine, fear of the pandemic
began to diminish and distrust of the vaccine started to take hold.65 Shortly
after the FDA licensed four vaccines to be used against the virus,66 a poll
taken by the Harvard School of Public Health found that only forty percent of
adults were sure they would be vaccinated.67 The Washington Post quoted
Gregory Poland, an expert on influenza vaccine at the Mayo Clinic, as
stating: “There’s a lot of misinformation out there. . . .Then you mix into that
people’s concerns about conspiracy theories and government misbehavior
and conflicts of interest and all of that, and the average layperson has a
difficult time discerning what to do.”68
In many ways, the vaccine campaign that was unfurled in the fall of
2009 was marked by a series of contrasting fears: fears about not being
able to get the vaccine, fears about being vaccinated, and fears of being
forced to be vaccinated. In the summer of 2009, New York’s Board of
Health, fearing that health workers would reject vaccination, issued an
emergency regulation requiring hospital workers with patient contact to be
vaccinated for both seasonal and H1N1 influenza.69 Health care workers
responded by filing at least four lawsuits challenging the regulation.70
Shortly after a state trial judge issued a temporary restraining order barring
enforcement of the regulation, the state rescinded it, noting the shortage of
pandemic vaccine.71 This litigation was echoed in cases throughout the
country brought by employees, or their unions, protesting hospital policies
mandating vaccination.72 Yet, while many health care workers fought
mandatory vaccination, most people who wanted to be vaccinated could
not be. By early November 2009, the Associated Press reported that only

64. Press Release, Weekly 2009 H1N1 Flu Media Briefing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/media/transcripts/2009/t091016.htm.
65. SteelFisher et al., supra note 8, at e65(5).
66. Press Release, FDA Approves Vaccines for 2009 H1N1 Influenza Virus: Approval
Provides Important Tool to Fight Pandemic, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 15, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/ucm182399.htm.
67. Press Release, Survey Finds Just 40% of Adults “Absolutely Certain” They Will Get
H1N1 Vaccine, HARVARD SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/
news/press-releases/2009-releases/survey-40-adults-absolutely-certain-h1n1-vaccine.html.
68. Robert Stein, Vaccine Is On Its Way, But Public Still Wary, Swine Flu Campaign Faces
Key Barriers: Unease, Ambivalence, WASH. POST, October 4, 2009, at A18.
69. 10 N.Y. ADC 66-3.2.
70. Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The Legal Landscape, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1949, 1951 (2010).
71. New York Court Stops State From Requiring Flu Vaccinations for Health Care Workers,
18 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1414 (Oct. 22, 2009). See also Order to Show Cause at 2-3,
Brynien v. Daines, No. 8853-09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 15, 2009); Order to Show Cause at 1,
Patterson v. Daines, No. 8830-09 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 2009), 2009 WL 3444742.
72. Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The Legal Landscape, supra note 70, at 1951-52.
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one third of adults who tried to be vaccinated, including those who were
considered at high risk for significant complications, could find vaccine.73
Parents were reported to be anxious and frustrated, as were doctors and
health officials, who had to deal with short and seemingly random
supplies.74 Then in December 2009, as supplies picked up, the CDC
announced two voluntary “non-safety” recalls of H1N1 vaccine.75
Meanwhile, worries about the pandemic abated, as the dreaded second
wave appeared no more virulent than the first. By March 2010, newspapers
reported that the flu season had “fizzled;” cases of flu had dwindled to fewer
than those in a typical year.76 With 155 million doses of H1N1 vaccine
distributed in the U.S., only 86 million individuals had been vaccinated, a
number lower than the typical number of people who are vaccinated
annually for seasonal flu.77
Fortunately complications from the vaccine appeared to be relatively
infrequent and usually mild. As of April 30, 2010, the VAERS had received
reports of 11,029 adverse events following the administration of the H1N1
vaccine, the vast majority of which were deemed non-serious.78 Only 7.5%
of reported adverse events were serious; a percentage similar to that
expected for seasonal flu vaccine.79 Fifty-six deaths were reported and were
being investigated, but preliminary findings did not “suggest” any
association with the vaccine.80
Was the campaign necessary? Was it a resounding success or a
dispiriting failure? Scientists will undoubtedly debate those questions in the
years to come. The sections below focus on a different, but no less
important set of questions: what role did law play in promoting the

73. Associated Press, Poll Indicates Swine Flu Vaccine Scarce, supra note 7.
74. Stephen Smith, A Day in the Life of a Pandemic, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 8, 2009, at
A11.
75. Non-Safety-Related Voluntary Recall of Certain Lots of Sanofi Pasteur H1N1 Pediatric
(0.25 mL, for 6-35 month olds) Vaccine in Pre-Filled Syringes: Questions & Answers, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/
syringes_qa.htm; Voluntary Non-Safety-Related Recall of Specific Lots of Nasal Spray Vaccine
for 2009 H1N1 Influenza, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 22, 2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/vaccination/sprayrecall_qa.htm.
76. Betsy McKay, The Flu Season That Fizzled: Cases of H1N1 Have Dwindled, Seasonal
Flu has Been a No-Show and Doctors Wonder Why, WALL ST. J., March 2, 2010, at D1.
77. Id. at D2.
78. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SUMMARY OF 2009 MONOVALENT H1N1
INFLUENZA VACCINE DATA—VACCINE ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING SYSTEM DATA THROUGH APRIL 30,
2010, at 1 (2010), available at http://vaers.hhs.gov/resources/2010H1N1Summary_May
07.pdf
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1-2.
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successes and fostering the limitations of the 2009 H1N1 vaccine
campaign?
PART TWO: INFLUENZA VACCINES – THE PROMISES AND CHALLENGES
The central role accorded to vaccines in U.S. pandemic preparedness
plans is not surprising. Vaccines are widely recognized as among the most
effective public health interventions.81 In the event of a deadly influenza
pandemic, vaccines are especially important because of the lack of
adequate alternatives.
Although antiviral medications may lessen
influenza’s impact, and when used in conjunction with isolation, reduce the
number of cases of influenza in a pandemic,82 many strains of influenza are
resistant to one or more antiviral medicines.83 The widespread prophylactic
use of antivirals may also lead to the transmission of resistant strains
Likewise, nonreducing the drugs’ efficacy for clinical cases.84
pharmaceutical interventions, such as quarantines, border closings, curfews,
and school closings are of limited (and contested) utility against influenza.85
They also impose enormous social costs.86 Vaccines, in contrast, can
reduce flu’s transmission without exacting widespread social disruption.87

81. See DEP’T OF IMMUNIZATION, VACCINES & BIOLOGICALS, WORLD HEALTH ORG. &
UNICEF, GIVS: GLOBAL IMMUNIZATION VISION AND STRATEGY: 2006-2015 3 (2005), available
at http://www.who.int/vaccines-documents/DocsPDF05/GIVS_Final_EN.pdf.
82. Some researchers suggest that the rapid use of antiviral medications could help
contain or at least slow the spread of a novel influenza virus. E.g., Marc Lipsitch et al.,
Antiviral Resistance and the Control of Pandemic Influenza, 4 PUB. LIBR. SCI. MED., 111, 112
(2007); Ira M. Longini, Jr., Containing Influenza With Antiviral Agents, 169 AM. J.
EPIDEMOLOGY 623, 630 (2004).
83. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevention and Control of Influenza:
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 2008, 57
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 39-40 (2008); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Influenza (Flu)
Antiviral Drugs and Related Information, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/drugsafety/informationby
drugclass/ucm100228.htm#AntiviralMedications (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
84. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Oseltamivir-Resistant 2009 Pandemic
Influenza A(H1N1) Virus Infection in Two Summer Campers Receiving Prophylaxis-North
Carolina, 2009, 58 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 969, 969 (2009).
85. See Julia E. Aledort et al., Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health Interventions for
Pandemic Influenza: An Evaluation of the Evidence Base, 7 BMC PUB. HEALTH 208, 213-14
(2007).
86. See Sencer & Millar, supra note 24, at 68-69.
87. Indeed, vaccines can provide what is known as herd immunity. If a sufficiently large
percentage of a population is vaccinated, the transmission of a disease may be disrupted. As
a result, even individuals who are not vaccinated may be protected. N.T. Begg & N.J. Gay,
Theory of Infectious Disease Transmission and Herd Immunity, in 3 TOPLEY AND WILSON’S
MICROBIOLOGY AND MICROBIAL INFECTIONS: BACTERIAL INFECTIONS 148, 151 (William J.
Hausler, Jr. & Max Sussman eds., 9th ed. 1997).
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Although vaccines theoretically offer our best defense to pandemic
influenza, developing and administering pandemic vaccines is not easy.
Both technical and social (including legal and economic) challenges
complicate efforts to rely upon vaccines in the face of a pandemic.
The technical problems relate both to the nature of the influenza virus
and the way vaccines used to prevent it are developed. The influenza virus
changes rapidly and thus far, new strains require new vaccines.88 In the
case of seasonal flu, vaccine is prepared based upon health officials’
prediction of the strains that will be prevalent during the next flu season.89
That prediction is generally made in February, leaving a limited amount of
time to produce vaccine for the next season.90 Production of pandemic
vaccine is even more challenging because a pandemic strain is inevitably a
new strain, and as H1N1 illustrated, cannot be easily predicted.91 As a
result, an effective pandemic vaccine cannot be developed until the
pandemic virus has been detected.92 By that time, however, as was true
with H1N1, the virus may already be widely dispersed around the world.
Complicating the problem is the fact that influenza vaccine is grown in
eggs, a time-consuming and delicate process.93 For years, scientists have
eagerly anticipated the development of cell-based technologies that could
eliminate the need for eggs.94 This would be especially important in the
event of an avian influenza pandemic since that virus kills eggs.95 Although
progress has been made in developing this technology, it was not available

88. For a more detailed discussion, see Lauren M. Smith & Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Influenza
Vaccine Production for the U.S. Market, 7 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY,
PRAC. & SCI. 259, 259-60 (2009). Scientists hope to develop a vaccine that will work for all
strains of influenza. See id. at 261-62. Until that happens, new vaccines will need to be
developed continuously to track the virus’ evolution.
89. Id. at 260.
90. TIM BROOKES, A WARNING SHOT: INFLUENZA AND THE 2004 FLU VACCINE SHORTAGE 1516 (2005).
91. Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Manufacturing Process and Timeline, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (August 6, 2009), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/h1n1_vaccine_2009
0806/en/index.html.
92. Id.
93. Smith & Gronvall, supra note 88, at 260-61. For a further discussion of the process
of developing vaccine in eggs, see BROOKES, supra note 90, at 15-22.
94. Smith & Gronvall, supra note 88, at 261. See BROOKES, supra note 90, at 18.
95. See Richard Harris, Pandemic Flu Spurs Race for New Vaccine Methods, NPR.ORG
(Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5039634.
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in time for the H1N1 pandemic.96 Indeed, in 2009, problems growing the
vaccine in eggs were blamed for delays in the vaccine’s production.97
The social barriers to the rapid development, distribution, and
administration of a pandemic vaccine may be even more formidable than
the technical challenges. For a variety of reasons, including extensive
regulatory requirements, the labor-intensive nature of vaccine production,
and the fact that vaccines are not given to individuals daily (as are many of
the most profitable medications), vaccines are costly to develop and provide
As discussed below,
relatively low profits to their manufacturers.98
manufacturers also claim that the risk of legal liability undermines vaccines’
profitability.99 Regardless of whether these risks are as great as
manufacturers contend, there is little doubt that in the late twentieth century
manufacturing capacity in the U.S. declined precipitously. In 1967, twentysix companies produced vaccines in the U.S.; by 2005, only five companies
did so.100 In 2008, there was only one domestic manufacturer of influenza
vaccine.101 The dangers of this meager supply became evident in 2004,
when one of two manufacturers licensed to produce influenza vaccine for
the U.S. market had to limit production due to contamination in a plant in
Great Britain.102 The result was a significant shortage of flu vaccine during
the fall flu season.103 As will be discussed below, many of the legal changes
initiated as part of pandemic planning focused on solving these “supply
side” problems.
Public health policymakers, however, have also had to consider the
demand side of the equation—the willingness of individuals to be

96. See Scott Gottlieb, Am. Enter. Inst. Pub. Pol’y Res., Responding to the H1N1
Pandemic with Vaccines: Vulnerabilities and Lessons Learned, HEALTH POL’Y OUTLOOK, no. 15,
2009, at 1, 4-5.
97. Id.; Stephen Smith, Swine Flu Shots Delayed for Most, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2009,
at A15.
98. COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF VACCINE PURCHASE FINANCING IN THE U.S., INST. OF
MED., FINANCING VACCINES IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ASSURING ACCESS AND AVAILABILITY 111-16
(2004) [hereinafter FINANCING VACCINES].
99. For a more detailed discussion of the perceived economic disincentives to vaccine
production, see BROOKES, supra note 90, at 34-35; Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan,
Legal Concerns and the Influenza Vaccine Shortage, 294 JAMA 1817, 1819-20 (2005).
100. Mello & Brennan, supra note 99, at 1820.
101. U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. POLICY REGARDING PANDEMIC INFLUENZA VACCINES 4
(2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/95xx/doc9573/09-15-PandemicFlu.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. POLICY].
102. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFLUENZA VACCINE: SHORTAGES IN 2004-2005
SEASON UNDERSCORE NEED FOR BETTER PREPARATION, GAO-05-984, at 1 (2005) [hereinafter
GAO]. See Cormac Sheridan, Next Generation Flu Vaccine Boosted by Chiron Debacle, 22
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1487, 1487 (2004).
103. GAO, supra note 102; BROOKES, supra note 90, at 43-46.
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vaccinated. Despite their proven efficacy – indeed, perhaps in part because
of their effectiveness104 – vaccines have always been the subject of heated
controversy.105 Ever since Edward Jenner demonstrated the efficacy of the
smallpox vaccine in 1798, vaccination has ignited virulent opposition.106
Many so-called anti-vaccinationists have religious objections to vaccination;
others simply believe that vaccines are unnatural and/or dangerous,
especially to children.107 This distrust of vaccines and, indirectly, the health
officials who recommend them, is widely evident on the many Internet
websites that stress both the hazards of vaccines (including their alleged link
to autism) and the supposedly impure financial incentives of vaccine
manufacturers.108 Although overall vaccination rates for American children
remain high,109 researchers have noted the growth in ardency, if not in
numbers, of this anti-vaccinationist movement.110 Not surprisingly, the
public’s unease, or just disinterest, in vaccines affects the supply. With the

104. This is especially the case with childhood vaccines. As vaccines have helped make
once-feared childhood diseases less common, many parents have come to believe that
vaccines pose a greater risk to their child than the diseases the vaccines prevent. See Steve P.
Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating
Their Children?, 37 UNIV. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 404 (2004).
105. ARTHUR ALLEN, VACCINE: THE CONTROVERSIAL STORY OF MEDICINE’S GREATEST LIFESAVER
passim (2007).
106. Id. at 56-111. Indeed, vaccination’s predecessor, the practice of inoculating
individuals with the pus of people who were sick with smallpox to prevent a severe case of the
disease, was also highly controversial. See id. at 28-45.
107. See Calandrillo, supra note 104, at 414, 416.
108. Andrea Rock, The Lethal Dangers of the Billion-Dollar Vaccine Business, MONEY, Dec.
1, 1996, at 148. For an analysis of these sites, see P. Davies, S. Chapman & J. Leask,
Antivaccination Activists on the World Wide Web, 87 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 22,
22-24 (2002); Anna Kata, A Postmodern Pandora’s Box: Anti-Vaccination Misinformation on
the Internet, 28 VACCINE 1709, 1709-15 (2010); Robert M. Wolfe, Lisa K. Sharp & Martin S.
Lipsky, Content and Design Attributes of Antivaccination Web Sites, 287 JAMA 3245, 3245-47
(2010). For an overview of the movement alleging that vaccines cause autism, see SETH
MNOOKIN, PANIC VIRUS: A TRUE STORY OF MEDICINE, SCIENCE AND FEAR 99-273 (2011). The
claim that vaccines, or more specifically thimerosal, a preservative that was once widely used
in childhood vaccines, causes autism is laid out in DAVID KIRBY, EVIDENCE OF HARM: MERCURY
IN VACCINES AND THE AUTISM EPIDEMIC: A MEDICAL CONTROVERSY passim (2006). Most
scientists reject this claim, as have courts in vaccine cases. See, e.g., Cedillo v. Sec’y Dep’t
Health & Human Servs., 617 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Hazlehurst v. Sec’y Dep’t
Health & Human Servs, 604 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Christofer S. Price et al.,
Prenatal and Infant Exposure to Thimerosal From Vaccines and Immunoglobulins and Risk of
Autism, 126 PEDIATRICS 656, 660-63 (2010).
109. CDC Survey Finds Childhood Immunization Rates Remain High, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2010/r100916.htm (Sept. 16,
2010) (reporting that the “coverage for most of the routine vaccines remain[s] at or over 90
percent”).
110. ALLEN, supra note 105, at 327-70.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

128

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:113

demand for vaccine uncertain, manufacturers are even more reluctant than
they might otherwise be to invest in increased production capacity.111 In
other words, lack of demand reduces supply.
It is not surprising that this skepticism or distrust of vaccines was
prevalent during the H1N1 epidemic which struck during a period in which
Americans questioned not only the competency but also the intentions of
many institutions, including large corporations and the federal
government.112 According to a review of several polls taken during the fall
H1N1 pandemic, only about half of all Americans stated that they expected
to be vaccinated.113 Concern about the safety of the vaccine was the most
common reason cited by those who expected to decline vaccination for
either themselves or their children.114 Critics went further and questioned
whether public health organizations, including CDC and the World Health
Organization (WHO), pushed vaccination in order to secure revenue for
vaccine makers.115 In response, WHO announced an investigation into its
handling of the pandemic.116
The coupling of supply side shortages with the public’s disquiet, and
even among some, zealous opposition, to vaccination presents policymakers
with a difficult dilemma: how can they speed up and increase the supply of
vaccine during a pandemic while ensuring that the public will accept the
vaccine when it is offered? In other words, can public health officials err on
the side of precaution when it comes to pandemic vaccines without
undermining the public’s support for vaccination? Section Three looks at
the legal strategies that have been employed to address these issues on the
supply side. Section Four looks at the tools that have been used or
contemplated to resolve the problem on the demand side. As the discussion
below suggests, both sets of legal strategies risk exacerbating the chasm
between public health officials and the public.

111. BROOKES, supra note 90, at 32-33.
112. PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR PEOPLE & THE PRESS, DISTRUST, DISCONTENT, ANGER AND
PARTISAN RANCOR: THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 1 (2010), available at http://peoplepress.org/reports/pdf/606.pdf [hereinafter THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT] (reporting on
polls showing that “[b]y almost every conceivable measure Americans are less positive and
more critical of government these days” and that only twenty-two percent of the public has
favorable views of banks and financial institutions, and only twenty-five percent has a
favorable view of large corporations).
113. SteelFisher et al., supra note 8, at e65(2).
114. Id. at e65(3).
115. E.g., Cohen & Carter, supra note 1, at 1274; Jeff Levy, Did the World Health
Organization Exaggerate the H1N1 Flu Threat?, NEW JERSEY NEWSROOM (June 10, 2010),
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/pdf/healthquest/did-the-world-health-organizationexaggerate-the-h1n1-flu-threat.pdf.
116. See Cohen & Carter, supra note 1, at 1279.
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PART THREE: SUPPLY SIDE LEGAL STRATEGIES
A.

Federal Investment and Regulatory “Reform”

Believing that quick and widespread availability of vaccines is critical to
combating a pandemic, the federal government has pursued a number of
legal strategies to increase the supply of vaccine.117 Perhaps the least
controversial policy has been the injection of federal money directly into
vaccine development and sales.118 As noted above, vaccines are not an
especially profitable enterprise for pharmaceutical companies; they are
expensive to produce and are used with less regularity than most
“blockbuster” drugs.119 These problems are exacerbated in the case of
vaccines for diseases that primarily affect the developing world,120 as well as
in the case of pandemics that may or may not occur. As a result, private
companies, operating without government support, are apt to invest less
than optimal amounts (from a public health perspective) in vaccine research
and development.
Assuming that the private market does not support what health officials
believe to be an adequate investment in vaccines,121 the federal government
invests heavily in vaccine development.122 It also acts as a large purchaser
of vaccines, helping to ensure a steady demand. For example, the 1993
Vaccines for Children Program provides federally purchased vaccines to

117. Efforts to increase the supply of vaccine have primarily come from the federal
government; hence this section focuses on federal laws and policies. In contrast, efforts to
compel vaccination have originated in both the federal and state arenas. Thus Section Four,
which looks at demand side laws, considers both federal and state legal issues.
118. As Lawrence Gostin has noted, ethical questions should be raised about the amount
of money the government has allocated to the development of pandemic flu vaccine in
comparison to spending on “chronically underfund[ed] more cost-effective public health
services.” Lawrence O. Gostin, Swine Flu Vaccine: What Is Fair?, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
Sept/Oct 2009, at 9, 9.
119. For a more detailed discussion of why vaccines provide relatively low levels of profits
to pharmaceutical companies, see BROOKES, supra note 90, at 34-35.
120. See, e.g., OWEN BARDER, RUGH LEVINE, MICHAEL KREMER, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV.,
MAKING MARKETS FOR VACCINES: IDEAS TO ACTION 3 (2005), available at http://www.cgdev.
org/doc/books/vaccine/MakingMarkets-complete.pdf.
121. Most vaccines are partial public goods; they benefit not only those who are
vaccinated but others. For this reason alone, it is unlikely that private investment alone can
achieve an efficient and adequate allocation of vaccines. See FINANCING VACCINES, supra
note 98, at 41, 43.
122. After 2001 and prior to 2005’s focus on pandemic planning, the federal government
enhanced its investment in vaccines and other bioterrorist “countermeasures.” See, e.g.,
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002); Project Bioshield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118
Stat. 835 (2004) [hereinafter Project Bioshield].
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millions of children.123 As a result, as of 2004, the federal government
purchased between fifty-two percent and fifty-five percent of all childhood
vaccines, helping to make vaccines widely available to children while also
ensuring a market for producers.124
The federal government has employed a similar mix of investment and
purchasing programs to secure pandemic vaccine. In 2005, Congress
allocated $3.3 billion to DHHS for pandemic planning, including vaccine
development and stockpiling.125 By December 2006, DHHS had obligated
$1.3 billion on vaccine-related activities.126 This money was spent primarily
on supporting vaccine development and procuring pre-pandemic vaccines
for the national stockpile.127 In 2009, in response to the H1N1 pandemic,
the federal government purchased the H1N1 vaccine, helping to ensure that
manufacturers would produce it.128
Congress has also sought to address supply problems by easing what
producers cite as regulatory burdens on the manufacture of pandemic
vaccines. In 2004, Project BioShield Act amended the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act129 to permit the Secretary of DHHS, after declaring a public
health emergency, to authorize the emergency use of drugs, medical
devices, and biological products (including vaccines) that have not yet been
licensed or approved for use, or have not been licensed or approved for a

123. 42 U.S.C. § 1396s (2006). In fact, public support for vaccination, and its forerunner,
inoculation, dates back to colonial times. See Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the
Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 267, 286-99.
124. See FINANCING VACCINES, supra note 98, at 47. The government’s large presence in
the vaccine market, however, can also deter production since the government is able, as a
large purchaser, to extract lower prices than would private payers. Hence government
purchasing may have both positive and negative impacts on supply. See id. at 5-6.
125. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
PREPAREDNESS SPENDING, CONFERENCE REPORT 109-359, at 1 (2006), available at
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/BARDA/documents/hhspanfluspending-0612.pdf
[hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
126. In December 2005, Congress allocated $3.3 billion to HHS for pandemic planning.
HHS reported that, as of December 2006, it had obligated $1.3 billion on vaccine-related
activities. Id. at 3. See Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The
HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House
of Representatives (Nov. 8, 2005).
127. U.S. POLICY, supra note 101, at 2.
128. See Dooren, supra note 62, at D4. However, as interest in the vaccine waned, the
federal government exercised provisions in some of its contracts to reduce its orders. Simeon
Bennett & Tom Randall, U.S. Trims Vaccine Order from CSL as Interest Wanes (Update 2),
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aNl27tKpye4g.
129. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
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particular use (so-called “off-label” use).130 By allowing the Secretary of
HHS to waive ordinary licensing requirements, the emergency use
authorization (EUA) procedure allows manufacturers to bring vaccines and
other so-called countermeasures to market before they are fully tested.131
Without this procedure, such vaccines could only be used as investigational
drugs, necessitating informed consent and all of the protections typically
provided subjects of human research.132 By allowing potentially wide use of
unlicensed vaccines without requiring those legal protections, the EUA
procedure speeds the process and lowers the cost of production and
distribution, theoretically enabling the rapid deployment of pharmaceutical
interventions necessary to respond to a public health emergency.
During the H1N1 pandemic, the EUA procedure was utilized, although
not for vaccines. On April 26, 2009, Secretary Sebelius issued an EUA for
certain antiviral medications, personal respiratory devices, and diagnostic
tests.133 This declaration was updated numerous times.134 Commentators
also speculated that an EUA would be issued for the vaccine, especially if it
contained an adjuvant, an ingredient that can be added to a vaccine to
boost its effectiveness, thereby stretching supplies.135 Ultimately the FDA
licensed the H1N1 vaccine without any adjuvant, and without waiting for full
clinical trials, reasoning that the vaccine was not fundamentally different
than the seasonal flu vaccine.136 Nevertheless, the discussion of a possible
EUA, and the decision to license the vaccine without full testing, may have
130. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2006).
131. The Act also allows the Secretary to impose conditions on the use of such products.
For a more detailed discussion, see Susan E. Sherman, Joseph Foster & Sonal Vaid,
Emergency Use Authority and 2009 H1N1 Influenza, 7 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM:
BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI. 245, 245 (2009).
132. Sandra Crouse Quinn et al., Public Willingness to Take A Vaccine or Drug Under
Emergency Use Authorization During the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic, 7 BIOSECURITY &
BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC. & SCI. 275, 276, 277 (2009).
133. See Sherman, Foster & Vaid, supra note 131, at 249.
134. KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, SEC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DECLARATION OF AN
EMERGENCY PURSUANT TO SECTION 564 OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT, 21
U.S.C. § 360BBB-3(B) (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/EmergencyPrepared
ness/Counterterrorism/UCM206802.pdf. For a more detailed discussion, see Sherman,
Foster & Vaid, supra note 131, at 249-50.
135. Quinn et al., supra note 132, at 277. Because there is no influenza vaccine with an
adjuvant currently licensed in the U.S., an EUA would have been required if the federal
government had decided to go ahead and order vaccine using an adjuvant. Id.
136. See General Questions and Answers on 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccine Safety, CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/h1N1flu/
vaccination/vaccine_safety_qa.htm#e. Earlier an FDA advisory committee had concluded
that the H1N1 vaccine would be sufficiently similar to the seasonal flu vaccine that it could be
used without waiting for the results of full-scale clinical trials. See Dooren & Winning, supra
note 61.
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helped to fuel a public perception that the vaccine was rushed and
untested.137
B.

Liability Protections

Vaccine manufacturers and federal health policymakers have long
argued that tort liability creates a barrier to an adequate supply of vaccine.
The argument and the debate surrounding vaccine liability dates back to the
1950s’ campaign to vaccinate children against polio when a contaminated
lot of the Salk vaccine killed at least ten people and paralyzed 164.138 In
the litigation that ensued, courts began to impose strict liability on the
vaccine’s manufacturers.139 Then in the 1960s and 1970s, appellate courts
held that vaccine makers had a duty to warn patients of a vaccine’s
potential dangers.140
Not surprisingly, manufacturers and the companies that insured them
were not pleased. Hence, when the Ford Administration decided to
vaccinate the entire population against swine flu, insurance companies
refused to provide liability coverage to manufacturers.141 Manufacturers, in
turn, refused to produce or distribute vaccine unless the government
removed their risk of liability.142 When an outbreak of Legionnaire’s disease
was initially (incorrectly) feared to be the swine flu that was detected at Fort
Dix, Congress capitulated to manufacturers’ demands, relieving them of
liability by creating an exclusive remedy against the United States for
personal injuries and death caused by the vaccine.143 As a result, when
cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome arose among those who were vaccinated,
federal taxpayers, not manufacturers or insurers, were left to bear the
cost.144
The 1976 program set a precedent and taught a lesson. The precedent
was that vaccine manufacturers would demand and receive liability
protection in order to maintain an adequate supply of vaccine.145 The

137. See text accompanying notes 237-39 infra.
138. See PAUL A. OFFIT, THE CUTTER INCIDENT: HOW AMERICA’S FIRST POLIO VACCINE LED TO
THE GROWING VACCINE CRISIS 89 (2005).
139. Id. at 133-54.
140. E.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d. 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs.,
399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
141. NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supra note 20, at 48-56.
142. Id. Indeed, manufacturers demanded that liability protection be afforded by act of
Congress. Contractual assurances of indemnification were insufficient to assure their
cooperation in the program. Id. at 59-62.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 247b(j)-(l) (1976).
144. See Joanna B. Apolinsky & Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Rethinking Liability for Vaccine Injury,
19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 548-49 (2010).
145. See id. at 548.
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lesson was that the government’s assumption of liability created significant
costs for the federal treasury. In response, since 1976, Congress has
consistently coupled liability protection for vaccine makers with limitations
on compensation for injured parties.146 For the most part, this coupling has
occurred in the context of limited no-fault compensation schemes that, at
least theoretically, provide faster and more efficient (if less generous) relief
to injured parties. In other words, the schemes provide some benefits to
both injured individuals and the federal government.147 For example, the
1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (NCVIA)148 requires plaintiffs
seeking more than $1,000 in damages for injuries related to covered
vaccines to file their claim initially before the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (VICP).149 Under this program, claimants who
suffer from so-called “table injuries,”150 injuries that are widely recognized
as clearly associated with vaccines and are listed on an approved table, can
receive compensation relatively quickly, without needing to prove
causation.151 Recovery, however, is limited to economic damages plus
$250,000 for pain and suffering or death.152 For so-called “non-table”
injuries, claimants can file a claim before a special master of the Federal
Court of Claims (the so-called Vaccine Court) and try to prove that the
vaccine caused the injury.153 In contrast to the 1976 swine flu program,
compensation for claims paid under NCVIA is financed by a special excise
tax on vaccines.154 Importantly, while NCVIA creates significant barriers and
disincentives to bringing a civil lawsuit, it does not preclude aggrieved
individuals from having their day in court. Parties who receive no award, or
are dissatisfied with their award from the Vaccine Court, can seek review
from the Federal Court of Claims and then the Federal Circuit.155
Claimants can also eventually bring a civil case in state or federal court, but
actions are barred for injuries that were “unavoidable” or for a vaccine

146. Id. at 554, 555, 557.
147. Id. at 557-58.
148. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10-300aa-34 (2006). For a critique of NCVIA, see Mary
Holland, Reconsidering Compulsory Childhood Vaccination, 24-26, 31-32 (N.Y.U. Sch. Law,
Working Paper No. 10-64, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=1677565.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14.
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-33(6)(B), 300aa-13(a), 300aa-15. For an explanation and
listing of table injuries, see National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, Vaccine Injury
Table, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/
table.htm.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15.
153. Id. at § 300aa-11.
154. Id. at § 300aa-14.
155. Id. at §§ 300aa-12; 300aa-21.
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maker’s failure to provide direct warnings to a customer.156 Thus, strict
liability claims are greatly diminished, if not barred. In 2009, in Bruesewitz
v. Wyeth, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Court held that
NCVIA also preempts all state law design defect claims.157 The Supreme
Court recently affirmed that ruling.158
Although vaccine critics initially lauded NCVIA for providing a quick and
efficient remedy to individuals injured by vaccines,159 they have more
recently assailed the program.160 In part, their criticism stems from the fact
that the Act places the United States in the position of defending vaccines,
and in recent years, the government has done so zealously.161 Moreover,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reviews
decisions of the Federal Court of Claims, has imposed relatively stringent
causation requirements upon claimants trying to prove non-table injuries.162
In addition, changes made by DHHS to the vaccine injury table in the 1990s
led to an increasing number of non-table claims.163 The fact that thousands
of cases alleging that vaccines caused autism languished for years before
the Vaccine Court concluded that vaccines do not cause autism164 also
156. Id. at § 300aa-22.
157. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), aff’d 2011 WL 588789 (Feb. 22,
2011).
158. As this paper was in press, the Supreme Court decided Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 2011 WL
588789 (Feb. 22, 2011) (holding that NCVIA preempts state design defect claims).
159. At the time, most of the controversy related to whole-cell pertussis vaccine, which
continued to be used in the United States even though a safer, acellular form of the vaccine
was feasible. For a more detailed discussion, see ALLEN, supra note 105, at 251-93.
160. Of course, whether claimants’ injuries are related to vaccines is precisely the question
on which vaccine critics and public health policymakers remain deeply divided.
161. In 1999, leading vaccine critic Barbara Loe Fisher criticized HHS’ role, arguing that
the agency had used its discretionary authority to undermine the intent of NCVIA and had
created an “uneven playing field.” Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources,
106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Barbara Loe Fisher, Co-Founder and President, National
Vaccine Information Center), available at http://www.whale.to/m/fisher88.html.
162. De Bazan v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 539 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
163. James B. Currier, Too Sick, Too Soon?: The Causation Burden Under the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Following De Bezan v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 229, 247 (2009).
164. Due to the number and complexity of autism-related cases, the Vaccine Court
established several test cases that would serve to decide key questions, such as whether
particular vaccines cause autism. For a more detailed discussion, see Hazelhurst v. Sec’y
Health & Human Servs., 604 F.3d 1343, 1345-54 (Fed. Cir. 2010). In the last two years, the
Vaccine Court has handed down a series of decisions in test cases, all of which have held that
claimants failed to prove that vaccines caused their neurological deficits. See, e.g., id.;
Cedillo v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 158, 182-83 (Fed. Cl. 2009), aff’d 617
F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Synder v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 88 Fed. Cl. 706, 745-
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soured the faith of parents who fervently believed that vaccines are linked to
autism.
Despite its limitations, NCVIA is more generous to claimants than
subsequent statutes limiting the liability of vaccine producers.165 For
example, Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act,166 enacted in 2002,
created an exclusive remedy against the United States for injuries caused by
the smallpox vaccine following a declaration by the Secretary of Homeland
Security.167 However, the scope of Section 302’s liability protection and
compensation provisions were unclear.168 In contrast to NCVIA, Section
302 did not provide no-fault compensation for those who were injured;
rather claimants had to demonstrate that the manufacturer or other covered
entity had been negligent.169 Given the relatively high rate of adverse
events associated with the smallpox vaccine, and the fact that there were no
naturally-occurring cases of smallpox, Section 302’s failure to provide clear
and adequate compensation is thought to have deterred many health care
workers and others from participating in the Bush Administration’s 20022003 smallpox vaccine campaign.170
In the spring of 2003, Congress responded to Section 302’s limitations
by enacting the Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003

46 (Fed. Cl. 2009). In at least one case, however, the federal government entered into a
settlement with parents of child who had a rare mitochondrial defect and claimed that a
vaccine, in conjunction with her defect, led to autism-like injuries. See Gardiner Harris, Deal
in an Autism Case Fuels Debate on Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, at A9.
165. A full discussion of the liability-limiting statutes and regulations that may be applied to
vaccines is beyond the scope of this article. Other provisions that might have been used for
pandemic vaccines, in the absence of the laws discussed infra, include Pub. L. 85-804, which
authorized Executive Order 10789, allowing for indemnification of federal contractors for
losses “arising out of or resulting from risks that the contract defines as unusually hazardous or
nuclear in nature.”
Exec. Order No. 13232, 66 C.F.R. 206 (2001) (expanding
indemnification under Exec. Order 10789 to contractors with the Department of Health and
Human Services); Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6
U.S.C. § 441(b) (2006), which provides broad liability protections for anti-terrorism
technologies. See Kevin P. Mullen, Extraordinary Contractual Relief: Public Law 85-804 in the
Homeland Security Era, 37 PROCUREMENT LAW., Summer 2001, at 1, 9.
166. Science and Technology in Support of Homeland Security, 6 U.S.C. § 182(2) (2006).
167. Homeland Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(p) (2006).
168. See Michael Greenberger, The 800 Pound Gorilla Sleeps: The Federal Government’s
Lackadaisical Liability and Compensation Policies in the Context of Pre-Event Vaccine
Immunization Programs, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 7, 17-19 (2005).
169. Id. at 18.
170. COMM. ON SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, INST. OF MED., THE
SMALLPOX VACCINATION PROGRAM: PUBLIC HEALTH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 51-52 (2005). If
the threat of smallpox had been more apparent, more people may have been willing to risk
the vaccine, despite the uncertainty of compensation.
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(SEPPA),171 which established a no-fault remedy for injuries listed on a
smallpox vaccine injury table.172 However, SEPPA’s compensation program,
which was administered by the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA), was substantially less generous than NCVIA’s.173 In
particular, SEPPA limited compensation for lost income to two-thirds of the
claimant’s income plus a modest addition if a claimant had a dependent.174
Moreover, SEPPA capped lost income awards at $50,000 per year, and
$262,100 (as of 2003) for a lifetime if the claimant did not have a
permanent disability.175 As of 2003, death benefits were also limited to
$262,100, or an annual payment of $50,000, until the youngest dependent
turned eighteen.176 In addition, in contrast to NCVIA, SEPPA’s remedy was
exclusive and unreviewable.177 Claimants who were unhappy with their
award could not bring a civil action; nor could they obtain review in any
court.178
Undoubtedly SEPPA was the model Congress used in 2005 when it
enacted the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREPA).179
Testifying before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce about
pandemic preparedness in November 2005, DHHS Secretary Michael O.
Leavitt explained the rationale for the act, which was passed as part of a
Department of Defense Appropriations bill:180
[A]s we seek to build domestic [vaccine] manufacturing capacity, we also
know that the threat of liability exposure is too often a barrier to willingness
to participate in the vaccine business. . . . It is crucial that those engaged in
this work be shielded from unwarranted tort suits. Accordingly, the
Administration is proposing limited liability protections for vaccine
manufacturers and providers, with an exception to allow suits to proceed
against companies who act with willful misconduct.181

171. 42 U.S.C. § 239 (2006).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 233(p)(2)(B) (2006).
173. See Greenberger, supra note 168, at 20.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See 42 U.S.C. § 239a(f)(2) (2006).
178. Id.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 247d (2006).
180. See Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address
Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
119 Stat. 2818 (2005). For further discussion about the Act’s legislative history, see Apolinsky
and Van Detta, supra note 144, at 559-62.
181. Assessing the National Pandemic Flu Preparedness Plan: Hearing Before the Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 20 (2005) (statement of Michael O. Leavitt,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
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The statute that Congress then quickly passed provides remarkably broad
immunity to the manufacturers and distributors of vaccines and other socalled countermeasures whenever the Secretary of HHS “makes a
determination that a disease or other health condition or other threat to
health constitutes a public health emergency, or that there is a credible risk
that the disease, condition, or threat may in the future constitute such an
emergency.”182 Importantly, the statute does not define the terms “public
health emergency” or “credible risk.”183 As a result, almost any potential
threat could provide the basis for a PREPA declaration.184 Moreover, the
Secretary’s decision to issue a declaration under PREPA is totally
unreviewable185 and the declaration can last for as long as the Secretary
specifies.186 Hence, the Secretary theoretically can issue a declaration
stating that cancer constitutes a public health emergency warranting the
Act’s protection for the manufacturers of all cancer medications for an
indefinite period of time.
Once a PREPA declaration is issued, all civil litigation against
manufacturers and administrators of a covered vaccine, or other covered
countermeasure, is barred, except in cases of “willful misconduct.”187 In
addition, PREPA includes several broad defenses available if a willful
misconduct claim is brought.188 For example, the Act states that an act or
omission by a manufacturer that is subject to regulation by FDA shall not
constitute willful misconduct if neither the Secretary of DHHS, nor the
Attorney General, has initiated an enforcement action with respect to such
act or omission.189
Following the pattern of previous vaccine-liability acts, PREPA also
established, but did not fund, a no-fault compensation scheme to be
administered by HRSA.190 The Act incorporates SEPPA’s compensation
182. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(b) (2006).
183. See id. at § 247d-6d.
184. The statute does provide factors to be considered in issuing a declaration. These
include “the desirability of encouraging the design, development, clinical testing or
investigation, manufacture, labeling, distribution, formulation, packaging, marketing,
promotion, sale, purchase, donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, licensing, and
use of such countermeasure.” Id. at § 247d-6d(b)(6). In other words, the Secretary is told to
consider facts relevant to the supply of a countermeasure. The statute does not help define
what constitutes a public health threat or a credible risk of such threat.
185. Id. at § 247d-6d(b)(7).
186. Id. at § 247d-6d(b)(2)(B). It can also be renewed or amended as the Secretary sees
fit, although it cannot be amended to retroactively rescind liability protection. Id at § 247d6d(b)(4).
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d(a)(1), 247d-6d(d)(1) (2006).
188. Id. at § 247d-6d(c)(4).
189. Id. at § 247d-6d(c)(5).
190. Id. at § 247d-6e(a) (incorporating SEPPA’s compensation provisions).
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provisions, except that in contrast to SEPPA, dependents of the deceased
can obtain lost income benefits in lieu of death benefits.191 Moreover, as
with SEPPA, HRSA’s decision with respect to a claim, as well as the
Secretary’s decision to invoke PREPA’s immunity, appear to be
unreviewable.192 If an individual, after having exhausted his or her remedies
with HRSA is dissatisfied, he or she is limited to bringing a claim for willful
misconduct.193
In 2007, the Secretary of DHHS invoked PREPA’s protections for
countermeasures developed or used in connection with H5N1 avian
influenza virus.194 This was done even though, at the time, no money had
been appropriated to the HRSA compensation fund and no regulations
existed to handle any claims that might have been submitted. At the start of
the H1N1 outbreak, on June 15, 2009, the Secretary of DHHS invoked
PREPA to extend the protections previously provided to the producers and
administrators of the H5N1 vaccine to those who made or administered the
H1N1 vaccine.195 Shortly thereafter, on June 24, President Obama signed
a supplemental appropriations act that allocated $7.65 billion to DHHS for
the H1N1 pandemic and authorized the transfer of funds to PREPA’s
compensation program.196 However, as of May 2010, HRSA had yet to
finalize regulations governing the claims process.197 Thus, more than one
year after the onset of the pandemic, and more than ten months after the
vaccines were licensed, claimants with significant injuries could file a notice

191. Id. at § 247d-6e(b)(3).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 247b-6b(6)(7) (2006).
The statute requires exhaustion of its
administrative remedy and makes that remedy exclusive, except for the limited remedy for
willful misconduct claims. A court, however, might read the denial of review narrowly so as to
not preclude review under the Administrative Procedures Act or 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Cf.
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 591, 603-04 (1988) (reading a statute denying review of an
employee’s termination claims narrowly so as not to preclude review of employee’s
constitutional claims).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e(d).
194. Pandemic Countermeasures; Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act, 72 FED. REG. 4710 (Feb. 1, 2007).
195. Pandemic Influenza Vaccines Amendment, 74 FED. REG. 30,294 (June 25, 2009).
The declaration also extended protection to so-called “program planners.” Id. This
declaration was extended on Sept. 28, 2009, and again on February 26, 2010. Dep’t Health
& Human Servs., Pandemic Influenza Vaccines Amendment, 75 FED. REG. 10,268 (Mar. 5,
2010).
196. See Pub. L. No. 111-32, 123 Stat. 1859 (2009).
197. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act Countermeasures Injury
Compensation Program, Procedures for Submitting a Letter of Intent to File Requests for
Benefits, 75 FED REG. 26,773-74 (May 12, 2010).
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to file a claim;198 however, they could not actually have their claims
processed, never mind be heard in court, unless they could establish willful
misconduct.199
PART FOUR: USING LAW TO INCREASE DEMAND
An ample supply of vaccine is insufficient to mitigate a pandemic.200
The population that is at risk must also be willing (even grudgingly) to be
vaccinated. If a pandemic is severe enough, or if populations perceive it as
very dangerous, acceptance of a vaccine is not apt to be a problem.
People will line up willingly, if not desperately, for a vaccine if they are
sufficiently frightened of the disease it prevents. Moreover, because a
pandemic vaccine will almost invariably be in short supply at the beginning
of a pandemic, the most significant problem policymakers usually face at
the start of a pandemic is not a shortage of demand, but of supply.201 For
this reason, public health policymakers and scholars have focused much of
their preparedness efforts on developing plans for rationing pandemic
vaccine.202

198. However, an injured individual can bring a claim in federal court, subject to PREPA’s
many defenses and limitations, if he or she can show “willful misconduct.” See text
accompanying notes 187-89, supra.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d(d) (2006). See also note 197, supra.
200. Of course, as noted above, the supply of vaccine will almost always be insufficient
during the early months of a pandemic. See text accompanying notes 88-100, supra.
Because of the shortage in the early fall of 2009, CDC released vaccine to state health
authorities, recommending that priority be given to certain high risk groups, including health
care workers, pregnant women, and children with chronic diseases. See Press Release, CDC
Advisors Make Recommendations for Use of Vaccine Against Novel H1N1, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 29, 2009), http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2009/r090
729b.htm.
201. See text accompanying notes 88-100, supra.
202. For example, in 2005, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and
the National Vaccine Advisory Committee provided recommendations to HHS on how to
prioritize vaccine distribution during an influenza pandemic. Those recommendations listed
vaccine and antiviral manufacturers, as well as health care workers, within the highest tier (i.e.
the group to first receive vaccine). Government leaders also appeared high on the list, while
healthy individuals between the ages of two and sixty-four, who were not in another category
by virtue of their occupation, were at the bottom of the list. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan D-10 tbl.1 (2005) [hereinafter Pandemic
Influenza
Plan],
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/AppD.pdf.
Nevertheless, during the H1N1 outbreak, that plan turned out to be of limited utility, since the
groups most affected by the virus (especially children) were not those who had been expected
to be at greatest risk. Hence in July 2009, the ACIP recommended that the H1N1 vaccine be
initially given to pregnant women, caregivers of young children, people between six months
and twenty-four years of age, and adults younger than twenty-four with chronic health
problems, who were not prioritized in earlier pandemic plans. Press Release, CDC Advisors
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Although shortages of vaccine are likely at the start of a pandemic,
public health emergency plans have also focused on using law to mandate
vaccination of individuals who choose not to be vaccinated.203 The use of
law to compel vaccination is not new. Since the 19th century, public health
officials have employed both law and sometimes brute force to impose
vaccination on the unwilling.204 The use of law to penalize an individual
who refuses vaccination during a public health emergency, subject to some
exceptions, was famously upheld by the Supreme Court in 1905 in
Jacobson v. Massachusetts.205 In 1922, in Zucht v. King, the Supreme
Court cited Jacobson in upholding a state law that required children to be
vaccinated in order to attend school.206 Despite this precedent, school
vaccination laws were not widespread until the 1970s when the federal
government urged states to enact them.207
In the fall of 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 and anthrax attacks, the
CDC asked the Centers for the Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown
and Johns Hopkins Universities to draft a Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act (MSEHPA).208 The draft that emerged proposed granting state
public health officials the authority to isolate individuals who refused
vaccination during a public health emergency.209 Many states have since
adopted this proposal.210

Make Recommendations for Use of Vaccine Against Novel H1N1, supra note 200. This
recommendation was largely (but not totally) followed by states in the fall of 2009.
Considerable consternation arose when the press reported that certain Wall Street firms and
other businesses were able to procure vaccine supplies for their employees, even while
supplies remained short for many high risk individuals. See, e.g., Bill Berkrot, Flu Shots for
Wall Street Stirs Ire In New York, REUTERS, Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idU
SN0512995020091105; Esmé E. Deprez, New York Businesses Get H1N1 Vaccine,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
content/nov2009/db2009112_606442.htm.
203. See text accompanying notes 211-22, infra.
204. James. G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements:
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 845-53 (2001-2002); Wendy K.
Mariner, George J. Annas & Wendy E. Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness: A Return to the Rule
of Law, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 341, 351-54 (2009).
205. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).
206. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 175 (1922).
207. ALLEN, supra note 105, at 245-47.
208. CTR. FOR LAW & PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITIES,
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 1 (2001), available at http://www.publichelath
law.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf.
209. Id. at 27.
210. See CTR. FOR LAW & PUBLIC’S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN & JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITIES,
MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT LEGISLATIVE SURVEILLANCE TABLE (2006), available
at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA%22Surveillance.pdf.
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The federal pandemic planning documents developed in 2005 and
2006 did not emphasize compulsory vaccination, but they did hint at its
possibility. For example, under the heading of “legal preparedness,”
DHHS’s November 2005 Implementation Plan advised state and local
public health agencies to “[d]etermine whether state and local laws allow
mandatory vaccination to [sic] protect public health, if needed.”211
During the actual 2009 H1N1 outbreak, no jurisdictions appear to have
used their public health emergency laws to compel population-wide
vaccination.212 In Massachusetts, however, controversy ensued when the
state legislature debated a modified version of the MSEHPA, stoking fears
that the state was seeking the authority to compel vaccination.213 In New
York, Health Commissioner Richard F. Daines promulgated an emergency
regulation requiring hospital workers who had contact with patients to be
vaccinated against both seasonal flu and H1N1.214 In contrast to standing
regulations in other states, such as those in Massachusetts, this regulation
did not permit workers to decline vaccination unless it was medically
contraindicated.215 New York’s regulation, which was issued before the
H1N1 vaccine was available, was met with fear and anger by health care
workers, many of whom resented the state’s imposition on their liberty and

211. Pandemic Influenza Plan, supra note 202, at S6-S9 (2005).
212. This statement is based on a widespread review of media reports of the outbreak in
the “major papers” library of LexisNexis plus a review in January 2010 of state regulatory
documents in LexisNexis’ “state administrative codes and registers” library. See 2009 H1N1
(Swine Flu) Legal Preparedness and Response, CTRS. FOR LAW & PUBLIC’S HEALTH (Jan. 27,
2010), http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Projects/swinefluphl.php.
213. Steven Smith, In Public Health Bill, a Contagion of Fear, State Rebuts Talk of Forced
Injections, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17, 2009, at A1. Since the fall of 2009, the bill has
languished in a deadlocked conference committee. Kyle Cheney, Prospects for Pandemic
Preparedness Bill Grim as Session Winds Down, BOSTON.COM (July 26, 2010),
http://www.boston.com/news/health/articles/2009/09/17/in_public_health_bill_a_contagion
_of_fear/.
214. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 66-3 (July 2009). Without doubt, there is a
strong public health rationale for vaccinating health care workers.
See Paris
Nourmohammadi & Brigid Ryan, Shooting the Moon: Should States Require the H1N1 Vaccine
for Healthcare Workers?, 7 J. EMERGENCY MGMT. 11, 11 (2009); Alexandra M. Stewart,
Mandatory Vaccination of Health Care Workers, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2015, 2015-17
(2009).
215. Compare 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 130.325 (2010) (regulation requiring hospital
workers to be vaccinated against influenza but providing medical and religious exemptions, as
well as the right of workers to decline vaccinations) with N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10 §
66-6 (2009) (providing an exemption from the mandatory vaccination requirement for health
care workers for whom the vaccine is medically contraindicated).
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feared the not-yet-licensed vaccine.216 At least four lawsuits were filed,
charging the state with violating state administrative law principles as well as
the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.217 On October 16, 2009, a trial judge
issued a temporary restraining order in two of the cases.218 Shortly
thereafter, the state revoked the emergency regulation, citing the shortage of
the H1N1 vaccine.219 After that, no other state mandated the H1N1
vaccine, although many hospitals and other health care settings required
their workers to be vaccinated.220 Some of these private sector mandates
also provoked legal challenges, generally alleging violations of collective
bargaining agreements and federal labor laws.221 Not surprisingly, these
challenges also garnered a fair amount of media attention, casting further
doubt on the safety and efficacy of the vaccine.222
PART FIVE: VACCINE LAW, PUBLIC HEALTH POWERS AND PUBLIC TRUST
In recent years, public health officials and public health scholars have
appreciated the important role that law can play in safeguarding public
health.223 This has led many to emphasize what has become known as
“public health legal preparedness,” which stresses law’s vital role in
responding to a public health emergency, such as a pandemic.224 In the
case of pandemic vaccines, the focus on public health legal preparedness
has spurred the enactment of several federal laws granting public health

216. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. & Karen Zraick, New York Health Care Workers Resist Flu
Vaccine Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2009, at A18. See Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The
Legal Landscape, supra note 70, at 1951.
217. For a list of cases, see Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The Legal Landscape, supra note
70, at 1950.
218. Id. at 1951.
219. Id. As Nourmohammadi & Ryan explain, health care workers may also have been
concerned because of a shortage of thimerosal-free H1N1 vaccine. Some states have laws
prohibiting the administration of vaccines with thimerosal to pregnant women and young
children except during emergencies. Nourmohammadi & Ryan, supra note 214, at 13.
Nevertheless, these provisions may reinforce the belief among health care workers, and
others, that vaccines with thimerosal are not safe, making individuals even more reluctant to
receive the H1N1 vaccine. See Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The Legal Landscape, supra
note 70, at 1950-51.
220. Parmet, Pandemic Vaccines—The Legal Landscape, supra note 70, at 1951.
221. Id. at 1951-52.
222. Id. at 1952.
223. WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH & THE LAW 267 (2009); Anthony D.
Moulton, Richard A. Goodman & Wendy E. Parmet, Perspective: Law and Great Public Health
Achievements, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 3, 3 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2d ed.
2007).
224. Anthony D. Moulton et al., What is Public Health Legal Preparedness?, 31 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 672, 672 (2003).
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officials significant authority to dispense with the normal rules regarding the
licensing and liability of pandemic vaccines. In many states, public health
legal preparedness has prompted the adoption of public health emergency
laws, often modeled on the MSEHPA, authorizing health officials, upon the
declaration of a public health emergency, to detain individuals who refuse
to be vaccinated. Supporters justify these laws as both practical responses
to the supply and demand problems afflicting pandemic vaccines and as
necessary corollaries to the widely stated belief that public health protection,
especially during an emergency, requires the sacrifice of individual liberty.225
In either case, these laws rely, to a significant degree, on a relatively simple
vision of the relationship between law and public health, one that assumes
that laws can protect a population’s health simply by granting officials
power to undertake measures that are designed to prevent the spread of
disease.
In reality, law’s relationship to public health is far more complex.
Without doubt, the informed exercise of public health authorities can often
improve public health.226 But in order to do so, public health laws must do
more than simply empower public officials; they need to foster a social
environment that is supportive of health. To do that, public health laws
need to take account of and seek to improve the public’s perception of
public health officials and other parties vital to the public health system,
including pharmaceutical companies. In other words, in order to protect
public health, laws must promote, rather than erode, the public’s trust in the
public health system. This can be challenging in an era, such as the current
one, in which there is widespread cynicism and distrust of both governments
and large corporations.227
It is especially important that pandemic preparedness laws inspire the
public’s trust.228 As a practical matter, no matter how much authority
officials are granted, laws cannot ensure that individuals wash their hands,
cover their mouths when they cough, or stay at home if they have flu-like
symptoms. Nor can laws effectively compel masses to submit to a
vaccination campaign or wait patiently while others at greater risk are
vaccinated. All of these health-promoting behaviors, which may be
essential in the face of pandemic influenza, require the population’s trust in
the public health system. If public health emergency laws foster that trust,

225. For a more detailed discussion, see Mariner, Annas & Parmet, supra note 204, at
354-55.
226. See Moulton, Goodman & Parmet, supra note 223, at 18.
227. See THE PEOPLE AND THEIR GOVERNMENT, supra note 112, at 1-6.
228. Heidi J. Larson & David L. Heymann, Public Health Response to Influenza A (H1N1)
as an Opportunity to Build Public Trust, 303 JAMA 271, 271 (2010); Quinn et al., supra note
132, at 287.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

144

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 4:113

they may be able to achieve their goals. But if public health laws erode the
public’s trust, they risk being ineffective in the short-term and dangerous in
the long-term as they instigate a vicious cycle in which health officials seek
greater and greater authority to impose policies on an ever-more unwilling
public.
Whether the vaccine laws employed during the H1N1 outbreak
enhanced the public’s trust in health officials or widened the circle of distrust
is an empirical question whose answer remains unknown. Without doubt,
H1N1 vaccine was produced and disseminated to large numbers of people
relatively rapidly.229 Moreover, the vaccine appears to have been relatively
safe.230 This “success” may have boosted the public’s confidence in the
public health system.
Nevertheless, there are reasons to worry that the extant pandemic
vaccine legal regime, which effectively reduced the risk faced by vaccine
makers while simultaneously diminishing the rights of individuals,231 might
have broadened the gulf between public health officials and a wary
public,232 a risk that might have been even greater if the H1N1 vaccine, like
the 1976 swine flu vaccine, had been associated with a large number of
significant adverse effects. Rather than assuring individuals that their safety
is the law’s first priority, and that they will be cared for if a vaccine causes
them injury, the pandemic vaccine laws that were utilized during the 2009
outbreak may have reaffirmed populist suspicions about the intentions of
government, public health officials, and vaccine makers. At the least, the
laws fit comfortably within the populist, antigovernment narrative, thereby
providing, however unintentionally, support for suspicions about the actions
of health officials and the safety of vaccines.
Consider first the least controversial set of pandemic laws, those
providing for government’s purchase of pandemic vaccines. Given that
pandemic vaccines are partial public goods, government investment in them
is probably necessary to assure an adequate supply. Without government
support, manufacturers would probably continue to under-invest in vaccines.
But by agreeing to purchase vaccines before the need for them was certain,
229. See supra text accompanying note 4.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 6, 78-80.
231. The question of whether PREPA unconstitutionally limits the rights of individuals by
limiting review of the Secretary’s actions, including, potentially, decisions as to individual
claims, is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the act’s jurisdiction-stripping
provisions clearly raise serious constitutional questions. For a relatively recent discussion of
the perplexing and oft-discussed question about Congress’ power to strip the courts of
jurisdiction, see Douglas E. Edlin, A Constitutional Right to Judicial Review: Access to Courts
and Ouster Clauses in England and the United States, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 70-71 (2009).
232. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 77-86 (1964).
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the government effectively shifted the risk of over-production from
manufacturers to the taxpayers. Indeed by investing so heavily in vaccines
and antiviral medications, the government ensured what leading antivaccinationist Barbara Loe Fisher called a “pharmaceutical company
stockholder dream scenario”233 and what leading public health law scholar
Lawrence O. Gostin more dispassionately described as a “windfall for the
pharmaceutical industry.”234
This possible windfall inevitably provided fodder for vaccine critics who
claimed that health authorities hyped the pandemic to support the interests
of the pharmaceutical companies. The belief that the pandemic was
exaggerated to benefit vaccine makers was widespread in Europe, where the
European Parliament and the Council of Europe, among other entities, have
investigated the close ties between members of WHO’s advisory boards and
pharmaceutical makers, questioning whether the interests of the latter
influenced WHO’s decision to declare a pandemic.235 Of course, as
Deborah Cohen and Phillip Carter noted in the British Medical Journal,
“[p]lanning for the worst while hoping for the best remains a sensible
approach.”236 If WHO and governments had not declared a pandemic and
governments had failed to invest in vaccines, and the virus had proven more
lethal, many more lives would have been lost. Nevertheless, by
guaranteeing that vaccine makers would earn substantial sums even if the
outbreak proved to be mild, the federal government, like the WHO, became
vulnerable to the perception that it acted in the interests of pharmaceutical
makers, rather than the public.
Other supply side laws utilized by the federal government during the
pandemic may have reinforced this perception. As was noted above, the
EUA procedure permits unlicensed medications and vaccines to be
administered when the Secretary of DHHS declares a public health
emergency.237 According to Quinn and colleagues, many members of the
public had misgivings about receiving an unlicensed vaccine and the EUA
procedure may diminish the public’s trust in health authorities.238 This

233. Barbara Loe Fisher, supra note 10.
234. Gostin, supra note 118, at 9. Focusing on childhood vaccines, Mary Holland argues
that the “vaccine industry has largely ‘captured’ its regulators” and that there is a “culture of
conflicts” between the industry and regulators. Holland, supra note 148, at 3, 36.
235. Cohen & Carter, supra note 1, at 1274. In April 2010, WHO responded to critics’
charge that the pandemic had been hyped by convening a review committee to evaluate
WHO’s response to the pandemic. See WHO Director-General’s Letter to BMJ Editors,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 8, 2010), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/
2010/letter_bmj_20100608/en/index.html.
236. Cohen & Carter, supra note 1, at 1279.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
238. Quinn et al., supra note 132, at 284-85.
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problem is especially grave among populations, including African
Americans, who already have high levels of distrust of public health
authorities.239 Although the research by Quinn and colleagues did not
consider whether the EUA process may also provoke distrust among people
who believe there are conflicts of interest between the government and
pharmaceutical companies, it seems plausible that such individuals would
be even more troubled than others about the EUA process. In other words,
individuals who believe that the risk from the pandemic was over-stated to
profit vaccine makers may be especially apt to believe that the EUA process
permits the use of dangerous, untested vaccines.
PREPA provides even greater fuel for populist conspiracy theorists. By
shielding manufacturers from virtually any liability, on the basis of an
unfettered and unreviewable declaration of a public health emergency, 240
and by limiting review of HRSA’s compensation decisions,241 the Act creates
the perfect target for anti-vaccinationists and others who believe that unsafe
pandemic vaccines were foisted upon a vulnerable public. Thus during the
H1N1 outbreak, the National Vaccine Information Center, one of the best
known and most active anti-vaccinationist groups, posted articles on its
website emphasizing PREPA’s broad liability provisions.242 For example, a
September 2009 article by Barbara Loe Fisher stated:
If you or your child are injured from getting a flu [sic] swine flu shot, you are
on your own. Because Congress shielded the vaccine manufacturers and
any person giving swine flu shots from lawsuits if people get hurt. There is
no funded government vaccine injury compensation program for swine flu
vaccine.243

Although this statement was misleading because the HRSA-run
compensation program was funded by September 2009, Fisher’s point was
essentially correct: Congress had shielded vaccine makers from almost all
liability. Moreover, the quite limited compensation program established by
PREPA was not yet up and running.244

239. See id.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
242. See Barbara Loe Fisher, Mild Swine Flu and Over-Hyped Vaccine, NAT’L VACCINE
INFO. CTR. (Sept. 29, 2009), http://www.nvic.org/NNVI-Vaccine-News/September-2009/
Mild-Swine-Flu-Over-Hyped-Vaccine.aspx; Barbara Loe Fisher, H1N1: Fact or Fiction?, NAT’L
VACCINE INFO. CTR. (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.nvic.org/NVIC-Vaccine-News/November2009/H1N1--Fact-or-Fiction--by-Barbara-Loe-Fisher.aspx.
243. Barbara Loe Fisher, Mild Swine Flu and Over-Hyped Vaccine, supra note 242
(citation omitted).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 196-99.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

PANDEMICS, POPULISM AND THE ROLE OF LAW

147

Ironically, as the public’s trust in vaccine diminishes, public health
officials seem even more anxious to compel vaccination.245 As discussed
above, compulsory vaccination laws are likely to be of little merit during a
pandemic in which the most pressing problem is a shortage of vaccine,
rather than the public’s unwillingness to be vaccinated.246 Nevertheless, as
the anti-vaccination movement has gained strength, public health scholars
have increasingly focused their attention on compelling vaccination.247 Of
course, correlation is not causation, but it seems plausible to think that the
renewed interest in mandatory vaccination responds in part to officials’
concern that the public is growing increasingly wary of vaccines and is evermore-likely to reject them.248
What is often overlooked when public health officials attempt to
mandate vaccination is that compulsory immunization laws can themselves
heighten the public’s distrust in vaccines, thereby exacerbating the very
problem the laws are designed to counter. This may especially be true when
mandates are imposed rapidly, with relatively little public debate, regarding
new vaccines, to which the public has not had time to become
comfortable.249 For example, an executive order issued by Texas Governor
Rick Perry in 2007 adding Gardasil, a recently-licensed human papilloma
virus vaccine, to the state’s list of vaccines required for entering school,

245. Likewise, the fear of frivolous litigation and the cries for immunity may well rise as the
public’s faith in vaccines diminish.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02.
247. There have been many articles in recent years reviewing and/or advocating for the
use of compulsory vaccination. See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, When Terrorism Threatens
Health: How Far Are Limitations on Personal and Economic Liberties Justified?, 55 FLA. L. REV.
1105, 1151 (2003); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health: When Patient
Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U.L. REV. 1335, 1390 (2009); Stewart, supra note
214.
248. There have been outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases that have been attributed,
at least in part, to parents’ refusal to have their children fully vaccinated. Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, Measles – United States, January 1 – April 25, 2008, 57 Morbidity &
Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1-4 (2008) (early release), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtmlmm57e501a1.htm; Daniel R. Feikin et al., Individual and Community Risks
of Measles and Pertussis Associated with Personal Exemptions to Immunization, 284 JAMA
3145 (2000). Childhood vaccination rates for children in the United States nevertheless
remain high. See ALLEN, supra note 110.
249. School vaccine laws, which generally compel children to have well-established
vaccines, and in most states include significant exemptions, may thus be different. Although
these laws have aroused controversy, they may not engender quite the same apprehension as
emergency laws requiring vaccines that are perceived as new. For the argument that school
vaccine laws should not be viewed as highly coercive, see Parmet, Public Health and Social
Control, supra note 25, at 45. See also Gail Javitt, Deena Berkowitz & Lawrence O. Gostin,
Assessing Mandatory HPV Vaccination: Who Should Call the Shots?, 36 J.L. Med. & Ethics
384, 385 (2008). For a critique of these laws, see Holland, supra note 148, at 41-44.
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created a furor among both social conservatives and libertarians.250 The
controversy became even hotter when word came out that Gardisal’s
manufacturer, Merck & Company had contributed to Perry’s political action
committee.251 Responding to public outrage, the Texas legislature overrode
Perry’s executive order.252
Likewise, New York’s attempt to compel health care workers to be
vaccinated against both seasonal and pandemic influenza ignited heated
opposition.253 Without doubt, there are strong public health reasons to
support the vaccination of health care workers. As New York State Health
Commissioner Richard Daines stated in an open letter to health care
workers, “Medical literature convincingly demonstrates that high levels of
staff immunity confer protection on those patients who cannot be or have
not been effectively vaccinated, while also allowing the institution to remain
more fully staffed.”254 However, while laws may be able to increase the
vaccination rate of health care workers, Daines’ emergency regulation,
which required workers to accept what they viewed as a new vaccine (for
which they might not be able to receive compensation if they were
injured)255 was almost destined to provoke a protest. The ensuring litigation
by angry nurses and their unions was predictable. Although commentators
might have been accurate in arguing that the Constitution permits a state to
penalize individuals who reject vaccination during a health emergency,256
their assessment overlooked both the strength of the protesters’ nonconstitutional claims,257 and the social impact of unpopular mandates. In

250. Micah Globerson, Protecting Women: A Feminist Legal Analysis of the HPV Vaccine,
Gardasil, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 67, 75-77 (2007).
251. Id. at 78 n.68; Sylvia Law, Human Papillomavirus Vaccination, Private Choice, and
Public Health, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1731, 1759 n.146 (2008); Pauline Self, The HPV
Vaccination: Necessary or Evil?, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 149, 155-56 (2008).
252. H.B. 1098, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007), and identical S.B. 438, 80th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 2007).
253. See McNeil & Zraick, supra note 216, at A18.
254. Letter from Richard F. Daines, New York State Health Commissioner, to the health
care workers of New York State (Sept. 24, 2009), quoted in Stewart, supra note 214, at 2015.
255. As noted above, HRSA’s compensation system was not yet in effect. See supra text
accompanying notes 197-99.
256. See Stewart, supra note 214, at 2017.
257. Public health lawyers often focus on whether a public health law is constitutional. But
litigators protesting such laws are perhaps more apt to succeed by emphasizing administrative
law and statutory grounds for relief. In the New York litigation, the plaintiffs argued that the
emergency regulation exceeded the scope of the Commissioner’s authority and violated New
York’s Administrative Procedure Act. E.g., Petition at 14-19, Patterson v. Daines, No. 883009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 15, 2009); Petition at 14-19, Brynien v. Daines, No. 8853-09 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 2009). See also New York Court Stops State From Requiring Flu
Vaccinations for Health Care Workers, supra note 71, at 1414.
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New York, protests by nurses contesting the emergency regulation as well as
the litigation about the mandate, received significant media attention.258
The impact of these stories, emphasizing health care workers’ resistance to
vaccination, is uncertain, but surely they did not enhance the general
public’s faith in the H1N1 vaccine. Indeed, it is hard to think of an image
more corrosive of the public’s trust in the vaccine than that of a nurse
protesting a law requiring vaccination.
Ironically, the battle over New York’s H1N1 vaccine regulation was for
naught. Commissioner Daines eventually concluded that there was little
merit in continuing to litigate a regulation requiring health care workers to
accept a vaccine that was in short supply.259 The emergency regulation was
rescinded before the vaccine became readily available;260 but not before the
damage to the vaccine’s image, and to the public’s trust in public health
officials, may have been done.
By failing to anticipate the potential social responses to his regulation,
Commissioner Daines may have misplayed his hand. Like many public
health officials, he may have viewed public health law as a potent tool for
promoting vaccination, a worthy goal from a public health perspective. But
what Daines and other public health officials and policymakers frequently
fail to recognize is that law, without the public’s support, may be of limited
utility. Suspicion and mistrust, so widely evident today, can cast doubt upon
public health laws that may seem both cost-effective and even beneficent to
public health officials. Suspicion and doubt can grow when vaccination
laws put all of the risk on ordinary individuals and remove all of the risk
from health officials and pharmaceutical makers.
Under these
circumstances, it is not surprising that nurses took to the courts; nor is it
surprising that millions of doses of vaccine had to be destroyed for lack of
use.261

258. See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Mandatory Flu Vaccination for N.Y. Health Workers is
Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/health/policy/
14vaccine.html; McNeil & Zraick, supra note 216, at A18; Delthia Ricks, Workers Rap
Vaccine Order, NEWSDAY, Oct. 11, 2009, at A02; Rob Stein, Mandatory Flu Shots Hit
Resistance: Many Health Care Workers Required to Get Vaccines, WASH. POST, Sept. 26,
2009, at A01.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 217-19.
260. See id.
261. See supra notes 11, 216-21.
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CONCLUSION
Many public health scholars and officials recognize the importance of
trust in determining the efficacy of a public health campaign.262 Writing in
the January 20, 2010 issue of the Journal of the American Medical
Association, Heidi J. Larson and David L. Heymann observed that:
Lack of trust can cause health programs to fail with harmful consequences.
Measles out-breaks in the United Kingdom and the United States and the
spread of polio across Africa from Northern Nigeria underscore the
importance of building—and maintaining—public trust in health
interventions and in the authorities who provide them. Trust relationships
must be built over time so that they become the social framework in which
health interventions—and positive health outcomes—can thrive.263

The authors go on to explain that transparency is “an essential criteria of
trust”264 and that:
rather than becoming defensive in the face of an increasingly questioning
public, the medical and public health communities must recognize the
importance of changing the conversation with individual patients and the
public and the importance of being open to hearing real concerns that will
affect the acceptance or rejection of health services.265

In making these important points, Larson and Heymann echo others in
viewing the public’s lack of trust in public health policies as a result of poor
health communication.266 But while transparency, listening, and honest
communication –all elements that Larson and Heymann associate with good
public health communication –are each important to the development and
maintenance of trust, they may be insufficient if the underlying architecture
of public health campaigns, created by public health laws, is distrustful of
the public.
By placing all of the risk of vaccine campaigns on ordinary individuals
and none on either public health officials or pharmaceutical makers, the
laws that governed the H1N1 vaccine campaign reflected a profound

262. See, e.g., Danielle Ofri, The Emotional Epidemiology of H1N1 Influenza Vaccination,
361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2594, 2594-95 (2009); David A. Shore, Communicating in Times of
Uncertainty: The Need for Trust, 8 J. HEALTH COMM. 13, 13-14 (2003).
263. Larson & Heymann, supra note 228, at 272.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. E.g., Ofri, supra note 262, at 2595 (“Our science has not been dithering at all, but
our articulation of that science has often seemed that way….”); Kumanan Wilson et al.,
Parental Views on Pediatric Vaccination: The Impact of Competing Advocacy Coalitions, 17
PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 231, 241 (2008) (finding that parental acceptance of vaccination
rates had to do with trust, and that public health “will likely have to consider alternative
strategies centered on communication targeted to the belief system of the recipients”).
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disrespect for the people they were supposed to serve. Indeed, when supply
and demand side pandemic vaccine laws are viewed together, they appear
to have presupposed that the public was both foolish and litigious. Why
else did these laws protect pharmaceutical companies and health officials
from the anticipated poor decisions – either to abstain from the vaccine or
to sue –of ordinary individuals?
By assuming that the public is the problem, rather than the client, of
public health services, pandemic vaccine laws risk exacerbating the growing
distrust between public health officials and the public. To put it another
way, by giving the public a legitimate reason to fear that public health laws
fail to allocate the risks associated with pandemic vaccines in an equitable
manner, pandemic vaccine laws risk reinforcing the suspicions and distrust
to which they respond. At the very least, these laws provide public health
critics with grist to grind in their mill.
If this hypothesis is correct, (and without a doubt more empirical support
is required to affirm it), the “solution” cannot rely simply on better
communication skills. Honest and transparent communication cannot “sell”
a product that disserves the public’s interest. In the case of the H1N1
vaccine, a candid and transparent disclosure of the risk allocation scheme
established by the pandemic vaccine laws would have required explaining to
individuals that although there was no reason to believe that the risks of the
vaccine were greater than those associated with the typical seasonal flu
vaccine, individuals who did experience an adverse outcome would have
been entitled to very limited, or no compensation at all, via a system that
was not fully established, and which was not likely subject to any external
review or oversight. They also would have been told that vaccine makers
that profited from the vaccine were absolved of almost all liability, even if
the vaccine was produced negligently. They would have been told that the
laws of many states permitted health officials (if a public health emergency
was declared) to detain them if they refused this vaccine. This transparent
and candid disclosure seems unlikely to entice many people to seek
vaccination, unless the pandemic itself were sufficiently frightening, in which
case, of course, there may have been little need to worry about insufficient
demand for the vaccine.
What, then, is the solution to the dilemma of pandemic vaccines?
Unfortunately, there are no simple answers. Public health policymakers face
real and complex problems in trying to ensure a rapid and adequate supply
of vaccines in the face of uncertain risks. These problems may make the
reallocation of some economic risk to the taxpayers sensible. Still, it is
critical that policymakers appreciate what law can and cannot do.
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Public health law is an essential and powerful tool for protecting the
public health, albeit one subject to constitutional and other legal
limitations.267 In the case of pandemic vaccines, public health law has been
used, successfully and not so successfully, to expedite the production,
licensing, and distribution of vaccines. Public health law may also provide
officials with significant authority to determine the allocation of vaccine, or
even, to impose penalties on individuals who refuse vaccines.
But legal authority cannot protect public health without the acceptance,
and perhaps active support, of affected populations. To garner that
acceptance, support, and indeed trust, public health laws must do more
than provide officials with authority or corporations with financial incentives.
They must also provide a firm basis for public trust, so that when public
health officials communicate with candor and transparency the story they tell
is one that does not incite suspicion.
To ensure that the story does not erode trust, public health policymakers
may need to reconsider how pandemic vaccine laws allocate risk, both
financial and legal. Almost certainly government investment in vaccine
research and production, and the potential conflicts of interest that may
engender,268 are unavoidable. But PREPA’s liability provisions seem far
more protective of industry, and far less protective of the public, than is
necessary or useful. Vaccine manufacturers receive significant liability
protections under NCVIA; but that Act is far more generous to individuals
who believe they have been harmed than is PREPA. Perhaps most
importantly, NCVIA provides some basis for accountability and oversight,
since claimants maintain the right to an independent decision-maker to hear
their claims. That most fundamental right, often associated with due
process,269 as well as our system of checks and balances, is insufficiently
recognized by PREPA.
In addition, there is little justification for giving individuals who are
injured by pandemic vaccine less compensation than they would receive if
they were injured by another vaccine. Indeed, since it is more important,
from a public health perspective, for an individual to accept a pandemic
vaccine, than many other vaccines covered by NCVIA,270 the compensation
267. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (2d ed.
2008).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
269. See, e.g., Concrete Pipes & Prods. Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S.
602, 617-18 (1993) (emphasizing the importance of a detached and neutral decision maker).
270. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Covered Vaccines, HEALTH
RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/covered_vaccines.htm
(last visited Jan. 9, 2011). Yet the tetanus vaccine only protects the individual who is
vaccinated and does not protect others since tetanus is not a causally-transmitted disease.
See M. PATRICIA JOYCE, TRAVELERS’ HEALTH—YELLOW BOOK, Chapter 2: Tetanus (2010),
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for injuries due to pandemic vaccines should be at least as great as those
under NCVIA. This should especially be the case for any vaccines that are
distributed pursuant to the EUA process. Individuals who willingly take an
unlicensed vaccine should not forfeit their right to compensation for any
injuries they may suffer. Rather, just like vaccine makers, individuals should
have their risks protected.
Public health officials may also want to reconsider their fondness for
vaccine mandates, at least during pandemics. As the H1N1 pandemic
illustrated, mandates are relatively useless in the early weeks and months of
a pandemic when vaccine is in short supply. But talk of mandates can
create needless anxiety and garner negative publicity, as antivaccinationists, civil libertarians, and individuals who fear they will be
subject to the mandate organize in opposition.
Most importantly, public health lawyers and policymakers should rethink
their conception of public health legal preparedness. In order to prepare
for a pandemic, or any other public health emergency, public health
officials must know the laws under which they operate. But legal “powers”
and extraordinary “authorities” alone cannot assure the public’s health.
Trust and the willingness to comply with the advice of public health officials
are also essential. For that, public health lawyers need to think both more
broadly and more subtlety. They need to consider how law can be used to
build a robust and resilient community that can withstand the ravages of a
public health emergency.271 Additionally, they need to consider how to use
law with a gentle hand that respects the rights and interests of not only the
powerful, but also the public that public health laws are meant to serve.

available at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yellowbook/2010/chapter-2/tetanus.aspx (“Tetanus
has no direct person-to-person transmission.”).
271. Mariner, Annas & Parmet, supra note 204, at 343.
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